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Abstract—One of the most important responsibilities of
every company is to preserve the integrity, conﬁdentiality,
and availability of its data. Many efforts have been made to
accomplish this goal: security policies, ﬁrewalls, intrusion
detection systems, anti-virus software, and standards to
conﬁgure services in operating systems and networks. This
paper focuses on one of those topics: intrusion detection
systems. First Denning’s classic model for intrusion detec-
tion is introduced, then two examples for doing intrusion
detection are presented that follow the guidelines of a new
approach: the use of evolutionary computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
This section provides basic deﬁnitions related
to computer security. It deals with the importance
of protecting data from intruders. After that we
introduce genetic programming and genetic algo-
rithms. This speciﬁc scope is adopted in order to
introduce topics of this paper related to evolutionary
computation applied to intrusion detection.
A. Computer Security
Computers are systems that store, process, and
retrieve data. Many activities in our modern world
deal with computers as tools to improve the use
of data. Data is a invaluable resource for every
company or enterprise, so it must be protected
against intruders or unauthorized users.
Computer security is the science that studies the
protection of data. Data in computers can be added,
modiﬁed, and/or deleted; and, in some sense, those
are normal activities performed over data; however,
those activities can be performed in a malicious way.
As examples, in a banking system a balance may be
changed fraudulently, or in a car insurance company
the number of at fault accidents of a customer may
be deleted in order to diminish the payments.
Availability, integrity and conﬁdentiality are the
three most important requirements for handling data
(1). Data must be present when the authorized user
or owner of the information needs it. Data must
be able to be changed in authorized ways by the
authorized user or owner of the information, and
ﬁnally, data must be known and changed only by
the authorized users and owners of the data.
1) Intrusion Detection Systems: An intrusion to
a computer is an action focused in gaining unautho-
rized access to the resources of the computer (2);
that is the focus of a virus that can be embedded in
an e-mail, a back-door in a computer program, an
unauthorized user who subverts the login security
of the computer, or an authorized user who tries to
exceed his or her own privileges.
Year # Host(miles) # Vul. # Incidents Inc./Vul.
1995 4,852 171 2,412 14.11
1996 9,472 345 2,573 7.46
1997 16,146 311 2,134 6.48
1998 29,670 262 3,734 14.25
1999 43,230 417 9,859 23.64
2000 72,398 1,090 21,756 19.96
2001 109,574 2,437 52,658 21.61
2002 147,344 4,129 82,094 19.88
2003 171,638 3,784 137,529 36.34
2004 233,101 3780 - -
2005 317,646 5990 - -
TABLE I
NUMBER OF HOST, VULNERABILITIES, INCIDENTS AND
INCIDENTS/VULNERABILITIES PER YEAR (DATA TAKEN FROM (3)
AND (4)).
An intruder can exploit system’s vulnerabilities,
deﬁned those as leaks in systems, like the ones
found in Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.0, Netscape
Enterprise Server 3.6, Real Secure Network Detec-
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Fig. 1. Incidents Reported per Host Advertised.
Table I shows the the number of vulnerabilities
reported since 1995 to the Computer Emergency
Response Team (4). We can observe, that since
1998, each year the number of vulnerabilities re-
ported1 doubles the previous year—except 2004.
The same Table I reports the number of incidents2,
and the incidents per vulnerabilities ratio. Look-
ing this information and Figure 1—that illustrates
the ratio of incidents per host advertised—we can
appreciate the exponential grow of incidents, the
dramatical increase on incidents per vulnerability
and the increase of the ratio of incidents per host
advertised since 1998, picture that gives an indi-
cation of the importance of security mechanism as
intrusion detection systems.
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a security
mechanism that looks for intrusions. To do that an
IDS must know in advance what the intrusions are—
known as misuse detection— or it must distinguish
between normal and abnormal activity in order to
recognize intrusions (2).
A real-time IDS looks for audit trail records as
they are generated by the operating system. By
contrast, an off-line IDS performs analysis after the
fact on audit trail ﬁles, i.e., it looks for past actions
and reports intrusions that have already happened.
IDSs usually have three modules (1):
1) the audit trail record collection module, or the
corresponding information module,
1Should be noted reported, in the sense, that nobody knows how
many was not reported
2Data available until 2003.
2) the record analysis module, and
3) the results module that stores results and/or
determines the action to be performed by the
IDS, according to the security policy.
This paper is going to analyze Denning’s intru-
sion detection model and two examples of IDSs, one
that uses genetic programming and one that uses
genetic algorithms.
B. Evolutionary Computation
Evolutionary computation is inspired in biologi-
cal evolution proposed by Darwin. In biological evo-
lution species that adapt to their environment have
a great chance to survive and reproduce through
natural selection. Species that survive, usually de-
velop new trends and capacities that can be inherited
or learned by offsprings, if those are proved to be
worth so that can be maintained through generations
(6). In Evolutionary computation, a population of
individuals survive and reproduce through “artiﬁ-
cial” selection. Fittest individuals are selected to go
to the next generation, or are selected to mate and
possible crossover to give origin to offsprings. Little
changes can occur in the phenotype of individuals
that are called mutations and that can continue
through generations if they prove to be “good” in
maintaining the ﬁttest (6).
In biology Organisms are composed of cells,
cells are composed of chromosomes, chromosomes
are composed of genes, and genes are the initial
piece of information of live (7). The set of genetic
material of an organism is called genome. A par-
ticular subset of genes is called genotype, and the
particular “values” of genes in the genotype is called
phenotype. In evolutionary computation, artiﬁcial
genomes are evaluated “judging phenotypical ex-
pressions of genotypes” (6). The ﬁttest are selected
to crossover and mutate to give rise to possible a
new genotype that is expected to be better than
its parents. This artiﬁcial evolutionary process gives
the idea of evolution to the best, i.e., climbing to a
maximum.
Evolutionary computation has been used then,
as heuristic method to solve approximately opti-
mization problems (6). There are some optimization
problems that can not be solved exactly because
they are NP-hard or the computational resources
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examples of NP-problems are the travel sales prob-
lem and the one-zero problem—which a classical
example is shown in Section IV of this paper.
Evolutionary computation has been widely in
artiﬁcial intelligence and as an optimization tool(6),
applied in robotics, pattern recognition (8) and so
forth. For a good understanding and mathematical
justiﬁcation of evolutionary computation see (6).
1) Genetic Programming: Genetic programming
(GP) was introduced by John Koza with the pur-
pose to generate automatically programs that solve
approximate problems (8).
Genetic programming has been used widely in
evolving neural networks, in complex systems like
Lindenmayer systems and cellular automata, in
evolving hardware, evolving parallel programs, and
so forth (9).
Genetic programs evolved are Lisp-like programs,
i.e., tree structures that encode programs using par-
ticular primitives according to the problem to be
solved. the macro algorithm that is executed in order
to generated those programs is (9):
(1) Random Generation of the
First Population of programs
(2)Iterate
(2.1) Execute each program in the
population and evaluate its output
according with the ﬁtness function,
(2.2) Selection of best evaluated
parents
(2.3) Reproduction with crossover
and mutation
Until Termination criterion has been satisﬁed
(3) The best program of the population according
with the ﬁtness function is the approximate
solution.
As an illustrative example presented by (7), let us
see brieﬂy the generation of a program to calculate
the orbital period P of a planet given its average
distance A from the sun. The candidates to be
nonterminals in the tree structure are the arithmetic
operators and the terminal—in this case—will be the
average distance from the sun of the corresponding
planet A.
If we follow the last macro algorithm the ﬁrst
question is how many random programs are we
going to generate in the ﬁrst population. The answer
is that that depends on the problem we are solving.
For this particular example (7) presented three of
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Fig. 2. Evolution of Programs. Taken from Mitchell M. (1998)
those initially generated programs, see Figure 2.
The ﬁtness values assigned to these three pro-
grams are f = 1 for the ﬁrst, f = 3 for the
second, and f = 0 for the third. These ﬁtness values
were obtained comparing the program output P with
six planet known orbits giving a 20% of tolerance
(7). This means, that if a program is approximately
correct, its ﬁtness value is 6. We observe in Figure 2
that the best program was program 2 and the worst
was program 3.
Continue with the macro algorithm, the best par-
ents are selected—according with the ﬁtness value,
giving preference to the ﬁttest—in this case parent
2 and parent 1, they crossover probabilistically and
sometimes mutate to give origin to a offspring that
is going to form part of the next generation. The
process continues until an acceptable solution is
found.
The genetic programming approach is quite rich
in theory, for more details see (10), (11), (12).
C. Genetic Algorithms
A genetic algorithm (GA) is an heuristic tool used
to solve approximately hard problems. In genetic
algorithms the possible solution is usually encoded
as a bit string that is called chromosome. At the
beginning of the evolution process a set of possible
solution are generated randomly. This set of possible
solutions is called population. The macro algorithm
for genetic algorithm is similar as the one shown
in previous section for genetic programming—see
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As is common in evolutionary computation in
GAs The evolution is guide by a ﬁtness function,
that is the one that evaluates each individual in
the population, given better score to the ﬁttest.
Crossover and mutation operators are also used as
is illustrated in Figure 3
One point
Crossover
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
Bit mutated
Interchange of genes
Parents OffSprings
Fig. 3. Genetic Algorithms Crossover and Mutation Operators.
What are then some of the difference between
GPs and GAs? Well in GP we have structure in
each program in the population, and each program
can dynamically grow or ungrow, i.e., usually there
is no speciﬁc size. By contrary, as is usual in
GAs, the chromosome has a ﬁxed length 3. In GP
as the evolved program approaches the solution
its ﬁtness value approaches to 0. In GAs as the
chromosome evolve through the solution, its ﬁtness
value approaches a maximum. In GPs the syntax
of programs should be preserved, i.e., a generated
program should be syntactically correct. In GAs,
there is no syntax, the problem is usually encoded
as a bit string.
For more details and applications on GAs see (7),
(13), and (6).
II. AN INTRUSION DETECTION MODEL
Denning’s pioneering work in IDSs is based on
the assumption that an intrusion can occur if there
is a deviation from normal activity (14). Normal
activity here is the activity performed by an autho-
rized user using the computer—the programs that
are executed, the number of logins per day, and so
forth—and the activity of the computer itself—the
CPU time used, the amount of I/O activity, and so
forth. See Figure 4 as an abstraction of static rule
base system.
According to Denning, various types of intrusions
can be detected with this model:
• masquerading: a user that is supplanted by an
intruder, in this case, it is assumed that the
intruder has a different activity pattern than the
normal user,
3There are some GAs that use dynamic size in chromosomes too.
Static Knowledge Base
Anomaly detection
Audit
real time
records in
Sign of
abnormality
Fig. 4. Abstraction of Denning’s Model.
• trojan horses: a program that is implanted by
an intruder; here the response time of the
computer can be degraded,
• virus: a program that is embedded in another
program and replicates itself, usually using
CPU time or performing a lot of I/O, and then
the use of resources is abnormal,
• break-ins: when an intruder bypasses the se-
curity of the computer and gains access to it
through the use of a “guest” account, supplant-
ing a deﬁned user in the computer, using a
trojan horse, and so forth; in this case there
may be more use of CPU or different patterns
of the use of the system by the supplanted user,
• internal intrusions: a user authorized to use the
system who tries to gain access to conﬁden-
tial information, or as a matter of example,
he or she sends information to an entity not
authorized by the company for which he or she
works; in this case the legitimate user can direct
data to a remote printer that is not used for that
purpose.
However, there is the possibility of false alarms,
i.e., there could be a deviation from the normal ac-
tivity due to different causes than an intrusion, like
the change of duties of an employee, the completion
of a program, or a new program in production.
A. Components of Denning’s Model
As mentioned previously, an IDS controls the
activity over the data and resources in a computer.
There are users—subjects—that perform actions on
data—objects. The actions performed by subjects
on objects are recorded in proﬁles, in order to
ﬁnd deviations from normal activity. Proﬁles are,
then, records that store the activity in the computer,
according to the policy deﬁned. A proﬁle is uniquely
identiﬁed by name, subject, and object.
1) Statistical Models: In order to capture in-
trusions the IDS has rules that use the following
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• The operational model where exceeding a pre-
deﬁned threshold is an indication of an in-
trusion. The threshold is normally deﬁned by
the security policy. For example, the security
policy can establish that more than three failed
attempts to enter a password should be re-
ported.
• The mean and standard deviation model where
a deviation from mean ± threshold ∗ stdev
is an indication of intrusion. The threshold in
this case is different than the previous one, in
the sense that this time four is normally used,
because in a normal distribution almost 100%
should be in that interval.
• The multi-variable model where correlation
between activities is used. For example, we
may need to take into account CPU time along
with I/O used by a program. It could be that
looking at the use of CPU time alone is not
enough for detecting an intrusion.
• The Markov chain model where activity is seen
as events and the probability of occurrence of
an event depends on the history. For example, if
a programmer usually uses a set of commands
in order to edit, compile, link and execute
an application, then almost always the same
set of commands is expected, and so the IDS
can know what command is expected. If an
unexpected command happens, then there is a
suspicion of intrusion and the IDS will signal
an alarm.
• The time series model where the time of oc-
currence of the activity shows its normality.
For example, the time of running a banking
settlement. The event occurs every business day
at approximately the same time. If the activity
happens at a quite different time (or has already
occurred) then there is a suspicion of abnormal
activity.
Besides statistical models, a metric is used. A
metric is a statistical variable that corresponds to
a new observation, i.e., a new audit record has been
generated and so a value of the metric must be
calculated according with the statistical model.
2) Proﬁles: In order to perform intrusion detec-
tion, Denning proposes the following data struc-
ture for a proﬁle: name, subject, object, action-
pattern, exception-pattern, resource-usage-pattern,
period, variable-type, threshold, and value.
Name, subject and object form the key of the
proﬁle. Action-pattern is the action we are looking
at as, for example, “read” or “delete.” Exception-
pattern matches the return ﬁeld of the audit record,
usually 0 means success in the system call per-
formed while another value indicates an exception,
usually −1, for example “no such ﬁle or directory.”
Resource-usage-pattern corresponds to the usage
of a resource such as CPU time or number of
pages printed. Period corresponds to a time interval.
Variable-type is the model used, i.e., operational,
mean and standard deviation model, etc. Threshold
is used in conjunction with the operational model
and the mean and standard deviation model; and
value corresponds to the actual value of the variable
in observation.
Proﬁles are classiﬁed as activity proﬁles, template
proﬁles and anomaly proﬁles. When an audit record
is generated, the IDS actualizes the corresponding
activity proﬁle and, depending on the model and
value, it can generate an anomaly proﬁle and raise
an alarm. If the activity proﬁle does not exist, then
it is created using a proﬁle template.
One of the difﬁcult parts of IDSs is the creation
or initialization of proﬁles. Denning suggests in this
case the use of templates. A template is a data
structure with the ﬁelds as enumerated previously.
If a new user is deﬁned in the system, when the user
performs his or her ﬁrst login, the IDS is not going
to ﬁnd activity proﬁles, and then the IDS is going to
generate the ones needed, using the corresponding
template proﬁles. All ﬁelds of the template are
copied to the new activity proﬁle, except subject.
Proﬁles can be used by an individual subject or by
an aggregation of them. In the same way proﬁles can
be used by an individual object or by aggregations
of them. For example, we can have a proﬁle for
subject “diaz” with object “passwd-ﬁle” and/or we
can have a proﬁle for subject “robotics” with object
“passwd-ﬁle,” where “robotics” is an aggregation of
subjects.
B. Analysis of Denning’s Model
The motivation for adding IDSs to computers is
addressed by Denning principally with regard to two
facts: the need to cover known and unknown ﬂaws
in systems. However, her model does not completely
accomplish that goal, in the sense that if a ﬂaw is
already known, the model presented does not cover
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The model, then, can be complemented with a
misuse detection model, and this can be done in the
following way: after the IDS looks for abnormal
activity, then it could look for misuse, using the
information stored in proﬁles. The system must have
knowledge of the ﬂaws or misuse in advance. This
type of analysis can cover more than one proﬁle
depending on the ﬂaw exploitation to be detected,
and should be done after the proﬁles have been
updated. For the case of an unknown ﬂaw, it is
almost impossible to predetermine what type of user
activity will be related to that ﬂaw, in order to create
the speciﬁc rule to protect against it.
Denning’s model is based in what constitutes
“normal activity.” A particular user who is not
intruding can still deviate from an expected pattern
of normal activity according to the IDS, if we are
using, for example, a mean and standard deviation
model. Denning proposes to solve this problem with
the use of aggregate proﬁles, called classes of pro-
ﬁles, so activity of users can be compared with pat-
terns established by a class. As an example, consider
the mean elapsed time between login and logout of a
user and the corresponding value for an aggregation
of users. If the value of the user deviates beyond the
threshold of the aggregation, an alarm can be raised.
It must be taken into account that the metric of the
aggregation—following this example—is calculated
as the mean of the total frequencies of the individual
user proﬁles that belong to that class (14). This
approach can be useful if the activity of the user
is low too, because there is going to be a deviation
from the norm in this case as well. This assumption,
of intrusion as deviation from normal activity, is a
good start to build an IDS. However, the problem
of differentiating between “normal” and “abnormal”
can be huge, if we consider the type of activity
carried out by different employees in a company.
Another aspect to consider is the initialization of
proﬁles, i.e., template proﬁles, because what can
happen is that a new user may not be familiar with
the system and so the number of false alarms can
be high (1). Denning proposes a ﬂexible or high
threshold at the beginning. However, a malicious
user can deviate from the expected normal activity
not only from the start, but also at whatever time;
in the mean and standard deviation model, for
example, the mean and standard deviation can be
moving slowly toward an intrusion. If we compare
the user proﬁles with the ones of his or her class—
as suggested by Denning—there is no guarantee
of the discrimination of the entire class compared
with the particular user class. For example, in the
class there may be two users, and the one that is
performing malicious activity may be the one who
performs more activity in the system. The class
itself should be weighted enough, i.e., if there are
not “enough” users in the class, then the class itself
can be shifted by the activity of the individual user,
and the approach to the problem then is useless.
A complementary approach—that we suggest—is to
take into consideration how the mean for a proﬁle
changes in speciﬁc epochs of time (monthly, for
example). If the mean has a tendency to increase
or decrease, then some abnormality can be present.
As another approach, two complementary models
can be used to solve this problem—the operational
model and the mean and standard deviation model—
if the mean goes far a threshold then an alarm can be
set, indicating the presence of a possible deviation
from normality.
Another difﬁculty in the same line is related
to the difference in activity at different times or
periods of the day or days. As an example, the
activity performed during a weekend is usually
different from other days, or the activity performed
during the hours of the day is different from that
performed during the night (1). Denning suggests
having table structures with the speciﬁc metric and
model according to the hour or day. This solution
seams reasonable; however, an excellent knowledge
of each type of user proﬁle is needed in order to
disaggregate events by months, days and speciﬁc
hours, not to say the huge amount of work to be
done for all employees in a company, in order to
accomplish this task. A complementary suggestion
here—given by us—is to have sentinel proﬁles for
those days and hours of almost no activity. If, for
example, an employee uses the system Monday
through Friday, from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm, then we
can use the users’ proﬁles for those days and hours,
and the sentinel proﬁles are used for the other days
and hours (weekend and night hours). A sentinel
proﬁle would be a proﬁle with its threshold zero
or near zero, according to the policy. If there is
more activity than the near to zero threshold, then
an alarm of possible intrusion can be raised.
How the system reports intrusions or how the
system stops to report intrusions is something that is
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a speciﬁc terminal where all messages are printed,
then an alert can be lost among a huge number of
messages—if such are present. The IDS then should
wait for the reception of a signal from the security
manager indicating that an action on the intrusion
has been taken. This implies that the operator of the
system is responsive 24/7, a fact that is important
in the sense that the IDS can detect an intrusion but
if no body takes care of it immediately, extensive
damage can be done. Once a intrusion is detected
and reported, how can the system be set to a normal
state again? Is the proﬁle activity that generates the
alarm re-set? If that is not done, then the system will
probably continue raising alarms—let us say, for
example, that a password failure value was reached,
and that the security policy says that after three
failed attempts the user account is blocked. Then,
ﬁrst of all, the security manager or operator should
check if there is an intrusion and handle it. After
that, the account should be unblocked, if that is the
case, then the activity proﬁle should be reset, so the
IDS does not continue alarming the system with the
possible intrusion.
The IDS model proposed could be quite a burden
for the system it monitors. If almost every audit trail
record triggers an action in the IDS, then the entire
system can be overloaded in terms of CPU time,
principal memory, and/or disk space required. There
is a trade-off between security and load on the sys-
tem. Besides that, some intrusions—as suggested by
Denning—can be difﬁcult to detect with the model
proposed. For example: it is almost impossible to
control the leak of sensitive information. Denning
says that this intrusion can be captured if data is
routed to a remote printer not normally used but
in the model there is no mention of device control,
i.e., which types of devices are allowed to be used
by users. The same happens with the inference of
data. Denning says that a deviation will be noted if
the user retrieves more records than usual but the
fact is that the user could retrieve a normal number
of records and store that information in order to do
aggregation later. For the case of viruses, if there
is no anti-virus in the system, a virus can delete
important information before it is detected, i.e., it
is not always the case that a virus uses signiﬁcant
system resources—and can so be detected. The goal
of the virus can be to destroy or damage important
parts of the system. A denial of service could not
be detected either. The denial of service can block
Anomaly detection
Audit
real time
records in
Suspicion
report
Distributed   Dynamic         K. Base
Fig. 5. Intelligent and Dynamic Agents Doing Anomaly Detection.
the entire system, including the IDS itself.
If the IDS model proposed is centralized, then it
can offer a central point of attack for an intruder.
Besides, if the IDS crashes then the entire system is
going to be unprotected. The next section is going
to present a distributed architecture that avoids this
particular issue.
III. A GENETIC PROGRAMMING APPROACH
One approach quite close to Denning’s ideas was
proposed by (15). Their IDS is based on Denning’s
premise that intrusions can be detected due to
deviations from normal activity. They implemented
the IDS using two ideas: genetic programming and
agents.
A. Components of the Genetic Programming Ap-
proach
The genetic programming approach is placed in
a rule base system. Agents learn normal and ab-
normal activity using a feedback-learning paradigm.
Each agent is a program specialized in a particular
type of intrusion. Agents act independently in a
dynamic environment—the changing environment
of the computer system (15). See Figure 5 as an
abstraction of this dynamic model.
The security of the computer is based on and
supported by a security policy (15). The security
policy guides and governs all the activities done by
users in computers—what activity is good, what is
bad, what is allowed, what is not allowed, how to
protect the system from intrusions, and how to react
in cases of intrusions. The security policy deﬁnes
security standards and mechanisms in a computer
system.
1) The Rule Base System: The question here is
how are we going to capture abnormal activity?
(15) propose that the computer itself, using artiﬁcial
intelligence, ﬁnd the rules.
How does genetic programming work? As with
almost every program in a computer, it has an input,
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the activity of a user in the computer, the process is
the rule base generated with the learning paradigm,
and the output is the suspicion grade of the input
received.
In order to generate the rule base system, evo-
lution is used. Programs evolve guided by a ﬁtness
function that scores the performance of each pro-
gram evolved. Operators and operands are given to
each program in order to solve the problem. Initially,
a pool of programs can be generated randomly; each
is evaluated according to the output given by it,
in this case, the suspicion grade. If the program
performed well, it receives strong positive feedback
and, on the contrary, if the program evaluates the
input incorrectly, it receives less positive feedback.
After each trial, the best programs are chosen in
order to perform crossover and mutation, with some
probability. The new programs generated are again
presented with an input, and their output is evaluated
again. If there is an intrusion and the program ranks
it as such, then the program receives a good score
and, on the contrary, if there is no intrusion and
the program evaluates that as an intrusion, then the
program receives a bad score.
Genetic programs have a tree structure, where in-
ner nodes are operators and the leaves are operands.
As a matter of example, let the operators be the
set of arithmetic operators {+, -, *, /} and the
operands the set of integers, then we can generate
a set of programs that perform the basic arithmetic
operations, as the example shown in Section I-B.1.
However, programs generated are not in a standard
computer language such as C or Java; a set of prim-
itives to solve the particular problem is used. For
example, source-port, destination-port
(15), and my-address (16) which return integer
values, and that can be used in conjunction with
generate-suspicion-broadcast (16), the
arithmetic and comparative operators, along with
FOR and IF THEN ELSE clauses, can be used to
form program sentences like (taken from Crosbie
and Spafford):
for-each-packet-do
if dest-port != my-address
then
gen-suspicion-broadcast
end-if
end-for
Although Crosbie and Spafford highlight that
primitives should be handled independently—for
example, primitives to handle interconnection time
should be independent from primitives related to
port addresses—in order to preserve semantics,
there could be some instances when the combi-
nation of some of them can be useful for do-
ing intrusion detection, like the ones to handle
source-port or destination-port com-
bined with average-interconn-time:
for-each-packet-do
if (0 < dest-port < 1025)
and (aver-interconn-time >
520) then
gen-suspicion-broadcast
end-if
end-for
The output of each program—the suspicion
value—is ranked using a ﬁtness function. The ﬁt-
ness function is the one that guides the evolution,
selecting the best programs from each generation.
The ﬁtness function proposed by (15) is
F = (100 − δ) − penalty
where δ = |outcome − suspicion|, and
penalty = (δ ∗ ranking)/100.
Outcome is a predeﬁned value that the security
manager of the system gives as the intrusion value.
For example, 90% is a high possibility of an in-
trusion, 20% is a low possibility of an intrusion.
Suspicion is the output of the program that is being
evaluated. If the program correctly evaluated the
input, then δ is near 0 and F is near 100 (contrary
to what was written by Crosbie and Spafford). If, on
the contrary, the program does not correctly evaluate
the input, then it is going to receive a penalty. The
penalty is ranked depending on the difﬁculty of the
scenario (17), i.e., the input. If the scenario is quite
obvious, then the ranking is high; if, on the contrary,
the scenario is somehow difﬁcult to discriminate,
then the ranking is low. In this way (17) tried to be
fair with each program’s suspicion value.
2) Distributivity of the IDS: The architecture of
the IDS is distributed, i.e., different programs run
in the target system, each looking to a speciﬁc type
of intrusion. Each program sends its suspicion value
to a centralized control system that gathers all the
suspicion values of all the agents and, depending on
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Agents can be added and/or removed, giving
ﬂexibility to the IDS. Agents can be retrained in
order to capture new types of intrusions (15).
Agents work cooperatively. As an example, one
agent can be looking at the number of connections
to a speciﬁc port, the duration of each connection,
the minimum and the maximum duration time of
each connection, the source, and the destination
port. Other agents can be looking at speciﬁc requests
to a Network File System (NFS), and so forth. The
ﬁrst agent can raise its suspicion value to a speciﬁc
connection that has taken place, and the NFS agent
can raise its suspicion value to a write request,
for example. Both send their suspicion values to a
MUX, which evaluates the danger and sends an alert
to the security manager, if required by the policy.
3) Tests and Results of the Agent System: After
generating the programs using genetic program-
ming, the three best programs were chosen and were
put in a production environment, where all were
submitted to different scenarios presented in Table
II (redrawn from Crosbie and Spafford, 1994). The
outcome of each scenario is given by the expert
and indicates his or her evaluation of the scenario
as being an intrusion or not. The suspicion value
reported for each agent is summarized in Table III
(redrawn from Crosbie and Spafford, 1994).
As can be seen in Table III, connections to
privileged ports was well classiﬁed by all the agents.
However, Login then long pause then logins that
corresponds with Rapid connections, then random
pauses in Table II with a high outcome (80%) was
misclassiﬁed by all the agents. The third agent’s
suspicion was 0%—the worst. The last scenario,
which was not intrusive, was severy misclassiﬁed
by Agent 1, somewhat misclassiﬁed by Agent 2,
and even slightly misclassiﬁed by Agent 3.
B. Analysis of the Approach
The idea behind the use of multiple specialized
autonomous agents gives advantages to the building
of IDSs:
• Scalability. Agents can be added and removed
from the system dynamically. New types of
intrusions can be monitored without disturbing
the distributed system, by the addition of new
agents as needed (17).
• No single point of vulnerability. The distributed
architecture of the approach gives no single
point of failure for the IDS. However, an agent
can be disabled from the system and there
is no reference to how the system manages
that situation. The net effect is that the IDS
will have a hole. As Crosbie and Spafford
suggest, an upper MUX combines suspicion
reports from all the agents; we can suggest that
to solve this problem, if the upper MUX has not
heard from an agent during a speciﬁc period of
time, then the Upper MUX should query that
agent in order to ﬁgure out if it is still running.
• Specialization of each agent. Each agent is
trained to accomplish a speciﬁc goal. This gives
granularity to the development of the system;
maybe the ﬁrst agents can be developed to
capture the principal intrusions and later on
others can be developed that can capture less
critical intrusions.
• The use of artiﬁcial intelligence. The rule base
system is proposed as automatically generated
by the computer, so according to (15) there is
no need for an expert to write the rule base
system. However, there should be an expert in
order to develop the training scenarios and give
the outcome of each one.
Some deﬁciencies are also associated with this
approach:
• There is no mention of control. If an agent
is killed, the IDS should report the event
and might restore to the killed process. They
mention (17) an upper MUX— that combines
suspicion reports—that receives each agent’s
suspicion value, combines them into an overall
suspicion report and passes it to the user, but
there is no tracking of missing agents in the
IDS. (See comments under “No single point of
vulnerability” above.)
• The architecture inherits the deﬁciencies of
statistical IDSs. Although artiﬁcial intelligence
is used to ﬁnd parameters and thresholds, more
tests should be done in order to ﬁgure out the
presence of a high percentage of false alarms.
• Previous knowledge of the outcome for the
speciﬁc scenario is implied. So, what happens
if a new scenario arises? What would be its
outcome?
• There is no mention on how the suspicion
value is calculated. The authors highlight that
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Type of Scenario Outcome
10 connections with 1 second delay 90%
10 connections with 5 second delay 70%
10 connections with 30 second delay 40%
10 connections every minute 30%
Rapid connections, then random pauses 80%
Intermittent connections 10%
Connections to privileged ports 90%
Connections to any port 70%
TABLE II
TRAINING SCENARIOS
Activities Suspicion report
A1 A2 A3
Connections to privileged port 83% 100% 98%
Login then long pause, then logins 31% 26% 0%
Logins and FTP with long pauses 73% 47% 25%
TABLE III
TEST CASES AND AGENTS’ REPORTS
cording with the scenario presented—difﬁcult
or easy—but how is that value calculated?
E.g., how does the system determine whether
the agent gives 80 for suspicion value or 83?
It is inferred that there exists a correlation
between the ranking of the scenario and the
suspicion value but the authors do not give such
a correlation—at least in the documentation
referenced until now.
• There is no mention of how to choose the best
agent to put in production. The authors propose
that after the training step, the best agent is put
in production but with the example provided—
see Table IV—the three agents perform well in
some scenarios and bad in others, so ﬁnally,
which is the best? One possible suggestion
would be to take into account the false pos-
itive and false negative rate of each one and
choose the one with best ratios—performing,
of course, more tests.
• There is no mention on how the upper MUX
combines the suspicion values reported by each
agent. The authors propose that each agent
reports its suspicion value to an upper MUX,
which combines those values and gives a ﬁnal
verdict to the system administrator, but there is
no information on what criteria is used by the
MUX in order to decide, based on the suspicion
values reported by each agent, if there is a
possible intrusion or not.
• The system is proposed as an anomaly detec-
tion system, but the agents are trained for mis-
use detection. Anomalous is a deviation from
“normal” behavior, this means that we have
knowledge of what is normal and whatever
deviates from normal is suspected to be an
intrusion. (17) state that the training scenarios
have a mixture of both intrusive and non-
intrusive activities. The agents are reporting
intrusions based on previous knowledge of
intrusions.
• The examples shown are quite simple. A query
can accomplish the goal of the agents presented
as examples. For example, to determine if a
port is privileged or to ﬁgure out if there is
a suspicion average time between connections,
can be handled by a query operation. Of course,
this is because the granularity presented in this
model is high. Maybe if an agent is trained
to captures a virus, and a new type of virus
is present, it is possible that the agent capture
the new one, because of the generalization of
a learning system, in this case from genetic
programming.
• Noting Table III, the authors report that Agents
2 and 3 performed better than agent 1. How-
ever, calculating the ﬁtness values for those
agents and setting the parameter ranking withVI NATIONAL COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SECURITY CONFERENCE ACIS 2006 - COLOMBIA 11
Activities Type of scenario Outcome Suspicion report Fitness value
A1 A2 A3 A1 A2 A3
Conn. Priv. Port Conn. Priv. Port 90% 83% 100% 98% 89.5 85.0 88.0
Login pause logins Rapid conn. rand. pause 80% 31% 26% 0% 26.5 19.0 -20.0
Logins and FTP Intermittent conn. 10% 73% 47% 25% 5.5 44.5 77.5
TABLE IV
FITNESS VALUES FOR THREE AGENTS.
a value of 50—exactly the middle of 1004—
it is difﬁcult to say exactly which agent was
the best, because we can argue that Agent 1
performed better that Agents 2 and 3 for the
ﬁrst two scenarios as is shown in Table IV.
We can change the ranking value of scenarios
supposing it “difﬁcult” (ranking = 10) or “easy”
(ranking = 90) as and the result holds.
IV. GASSATA, A GENETIC ALGORITHM THAT
PERFORMS OFF-LINE INTRUSION DETECTION
GASSATA (18) is an off-line tool that increases
security audit trail analysis efﬁciency. The main
ideas of this algorithm are the following:
• to perform misuse detection by comparing the
user’s behavior against a matrix of known
attacks,
• to explain the data contained in the audit trail
by hypothesizing the occurrence of one or more
attacks, and
• to use a heuristic method, genetic algorithms,
to solve it because explaining the data is an
NP-complete problem.
See Figure 6 as an abstraction of this model.
Offline
records
Audit
Possible
attacks
Static Table
Misuse detection
A. R.
Fig. 6. Off-line Misuse Detection Abstraction.
A. Description of the Genetic Algorithm Approach
This approach can be formalized thus:
• let Ne be the number of distinct event types
audited,
4Authors set the increment in penalty by ranking/100 but they
do not provide ranges for ranking.
• let Na be the number of known attack types,
• let AE be an Ne × Na attack-event matrix that
gives the set of events generated by each attack,
• let W be a one-dimensional array of length Na
called the weighted vector that gives the risk
of each attack,
• let OV be a one-dimensional vector of length
Ne called the observed vector, where OVi
counts the number of events of type i present
in the audit trail, and
• let I be a one dimensional vector of length Na
called the hypothesis vector, where Ii = 1 if
attack i is present and Ii = 0 otherwise.
To explain the data contained in the audit trail by
the occurrence of one or more attacks, GASSATA
attempts to ﬁnd the I vector that maximizes the W·I
product, i.e., maximizes
Na X
i=1
Wi ∗ Ii
subject to the constraint
(AE · I)i ≤ OVi
So, in order to evaluate the hypothesis I cor-
responding to a particular subset of attacks, the
algorithm ﬁrst calculates the W · I inner product
and then the constraint.
In order to evaluate the constraint, the algorithm
counts the number of events of each type generated
by all the attacks hypothesized in I. If these num-
bers are less than or equal to the number of events
recorded in the audit trail, then the hypothesis is
realistic. On the contrary, if some of those numbers
are greater than the actual number of events that
occurred, then the proposed solution I is penalized
as being unrealistic.
The ﬁtness function proposed by M´ e that captures
these ideas is then
F(I) = α +
Na X
i=1
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where α is used to maintain F(I) > 0, in order
to maintain some diversity in the population, β
provides a slope for the penalty function, P cor-
responds to the penalizing of a proposed solution
that fails the constraint, i.e., if (AE · I)i > OVi.
The penalty function is
P = T
2
where T is the number of times for which (AE ·
I)i > OVi. M´ e reports good results with GASSATA.
B. Analysis of the Fitness Function suggested in
GASSATA
As with many heuristic tools, we have here the
problem of how to provide accurate values for
parameters, in this case α, W, and β in order to
maximize the ﬁtness function F(I):
F(I) = α +
Na X
i=1
Wi ∗ Ii − β ∗ T
2. (1)
1) Case I (19):
PNa
i=1 Ii vs. T 2 comparison.: As
we are going to compare the term with I against the
term with T, let us begin by setting parameters as
α = 0, β = 1 and ∀i Wi = 15, and take into account
the variables involved in the ﬁtness function. This
approximation gives us
F(I) =
Na X
i=1
Ii − T
2 (2)
Testing was done with Equation 2, and it was
found that all the individuals had ﬁtness equal to
zero in the ﬁrst generation. The algorithm was run
ﬁve times and in all the cases the ﬁtness for each
individual was zero.
The last fact seems to happen because the term
T 2 tends to dominate the term
PNa
i=1 Ii. In fact, 0 <
T 2 < N2
e, and 0 <
PNa
i=1 Ii < Na, where Ne = 28,
and Na = 24, for this study.
So now we take into account the use of param-
eters. There are at least three ways to handle this
result in this particular case, in order to get positive
ﬁtness values:
1) set α to a sufﬁciently positive value,
2) set β to a sufﬁciently small positive value less
than one (i.e., 0 < β < 1), and
5Wi was chosen equal to 1 ∀i in order to simplify the analysis
3) use T rather that T 2 (and use an appropriate
β). In this case we are considering the power
of T as a parameter, and maybe it is quite
high, so we suggest as an alternative to change
it to 1.
Let’s deal with the ﬁrst two. As the average
of
PNa
i=1 Ii is 12 (for random hypotheses) and the
average T is 14 (i.e., T 2 is 196 using the average of
T) then, in order to balance the two terms and have
a F(I) positive, we set β to 1/20, then Equation 2
becomes
F(I) =
Na X
i=1
Ii − (1/20) ∗ T
2 (3)
This time an average 21% of the individuals had
ﬁtness values less than or equal to zero in the ﬁrst
generation, so things were better, but not enough; we
are trying to implement M´ e’s paper, and he proposes
to use α in order to avoid a negative ﬁtness value
(18).
So, now it appears necessary to use α in order to
handle the 21% of individuals that have ﬁtness less
than or equal to zero. Testing was done in order
to appreciate the magnitude of the negative value
of these individuals, and the maximum found was
−4.0. So, setting α to 4.0, Equation 3 becomes
F(I) = 4.0 +
Na X
i=1
Ii − (1/20) ∗ T
2 (4)
Table V shows the results obtained for user with
ID = 2051—data downloaded from the Lincoln
Laboratory—and the ﬁtness function as in Equation
4. The column Detected means the number of
intrusions detected by the algorithm—in this case,
there are in total 4 intrusions in the ﬁle.
There are a great number of false positives. So,
is the penalty function not functioning? Is
PNa
i=1 Ii
guiding the algorithm in the wrong way? To exam-
ine these questions the next section looks at the third
approach just proposed, i.e., the use of T instead of
T 2, comparing
PNa
i=1 Ii with T.
2) Case II (19):
PNa
i=1 Ii vs. T comparison.: Let
us now try the third case where the penalty function
is set to P = T, and in order to do analysis let
us combine the two terms
PNa
i=1 Ii and T into the
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Run False + False - Detected
1 10 1 3
2 7 0 4
3 8 1 3
4 9 1 3
5 9 0 4
6 9 1 3
7 8 1 3
8 10 1 3
9 10 1 3
10 7 1 3
TABLE V
RESULTS WITH F(I) = 4.0 +
PNa
i=1 Ii − (1/20) ∗ T
2
F(I) =
Na X
i=1
Ii − T (5)
We still observed some negative values and, as PNa
i=1 Ii and T are quite similar in this test, we make
use of the α parameter. We found that the greatest
negative ﬁtness value was −4.0 again, so we set
α = 4.0. The results are shown in Table VI for the
same user as in Case I.
Run False + False - Detected
1 7 0 4
2 7 1 3
3 12 0 4
4 5 0 4
5 6 1 3
6 5 0 4
7 7 1 3
8 6 0 4
9 8 0 4
10 4 0 4
TABLE VI
RESULTS WITH F(I) = 4.0 +
PNa
i=1 Ii − T
Now, using Equation 5 instead of Equation 4 we
can address the following facts:
• there are 30.9% fewer false positive,
• there are 62.5% fewer false negative, and
• the algorithm found seven of ten times the total
number of intrusions (there were 4 intrusions),
against two of ten times, as was shown in
Tables V and VI.
However a great number of false positives is
still present (see Table VI). What is causing that
problem? The answer is that the role of the term
PNa
i=1 Wi ∗ Ii is to guide the solution to have the
maximum number of intrusions. However, this is
good enough only until the correct set of intrusions
are found. Later on, i.e., if more intrusions than
that are hypothesized, the problem of false positives
occurs. The next section shows in detail how ﬁtness
values are calculated.
a) Fitness function evaluation.: Table VII
gives the attack event matrix AE (18), an individual
I hypothesized in the last generation, the AE · I
product, the observed vector OV, and the counts of
overestimates for that individual T.
How does the ﬁtness function accomplish its
goal? Each 1 in the I vector adds one to the ﬁtness
value, and the total of overestimates elevated to the
power of two is subtracted according to Equation 1.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
 
 
 
 
                           
0                           0                 0
0                           0                 0
1                           0                 0
    0                           0                 0
0                           0                 0
 1                           2                 20
1                           0                 0
0                           0                 6
0                           0                 0
0                           4                 4       
0                           0                 0
 0                           62               94
1                           0                 0
1                           0                 0
    
                                 30               1335
                             0                 0
1                           3                 0       1
1                           5                 0       1
1                           8                 0       1
                                 3                 459
                             0                 0
1                           100             0       1
1                           30               76
                0                           0                 0                
1                           5                 5
OV      I                        AE*I                       T
0                           1                 0       1
0
1                           10               0       1 2
1
 0                           5                 42 3
Event
Fig. 7. Fitness function evaluation
Figure 7 shows three cases (20). In 1 we have a
ﬁrst case. An intrusion of type 3 was hypothesized
(I3 = 1) so 1 more is added to the ﬁtness value and,
as the multiplied vector that corresponds to this en-
try gives more events than the number of events that
really happened (MV2 > OV2), one is subtracted
from the ﬁtness. So, one is added, because the attack
was hypothesized, and one is subtracted, because
the hypothesis was wrong, corresponding to entry
two in the (AE · I)i < OVi comparison. The total
change to the ﬁtness is zero, making no differenceVI NATIONAL COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SECURITY CONFERENCE ACIS 2006 - COLOMBIA 14
A T T A C K   #
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 I AE*I OV T T'
0 3 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
2 1   0 1 0 1 1
3 3   1 0 0
4 3     0 0 0
5 3     8 1 8 0 1 1
6 5 1 5 1 10 0 1 2
7 30   1 30 76
8 5 1 5 0 1 1
  9 3 0 0 0
# 10 2 1 2 20
  11 3 1 3 0 1 1
T 12 10 1 1 0 0
N 13 1 0 0 6
E 14 1 0 0 0
V 15 4 0 4 4
E 16 1 0 0 0
17 3 35 5 8 3 2 3 10 3 300 2 5 4 0 62 94
18 100 1 100 0 1 1
19 5 0 5 42
20 10 1 0 0
21 1 1 0 0
22 0 0 0
23 5 1 5 5
24 1 0 0
25 1 3 3 459
26 30   30 1335
27 50 0 0
TABLE VII
AE MATRIX TAKEN FROM LUDOVIC M´ E, I VECTOR, AE ∗ I PRODUCT, OBSERVED VECTOR OV, AND PENALTY COUNTS T AND T’
in the ﬁtness value despite an incorrect hypothesis.
This allows for false positives.
In 2 we have a second case. An intrusion of
type 5 was hypothesized so 1 more is added and
this intrusion is inﬂuenced by events 6, 7, and 17
(see Table VII). In the case that an attack hypothesis
requires a number of events greater than the number
of events that really happened, one is subtracted.
This is the case for event 6 where 10 > 0. For event
7 there is no penalty—we observe 30 < 76, and for
event 17, there is no penalty either because 62 <
94. Then one was added because the attack was
hypothesized, and one was subtracted, because for
event type 6 there were more events required than
really happened. So in this case—as the previous
one—there is no difference in the ﬁtness value
despite the fact that the algorithm produced a false
hypothesis.
In 3 we have a third special case. An intrusion
of type 21 was hypothesized and this entry is inﬂu-
enced by three positions in the hypothesis vector:
position 6 again, 17 again, and 23 (see Table VII).
So, in this case, again, as an intrusion has been
hypothesized one is added to the ﬁtness value. As
for the penalty, for the cases of positions 17 and 23
there is no penalty at all because the corresponding
entries for 17 and 23 in the multiplied vector are
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of events that occurred, and for the case of event
6, there is no penalty either, because the penalty
was already taken into account for the hypothesized
intrusion of type 5 (case 2 ). So in this third case,
where there should be a penalty, there is no penalty,
and this makes the algorithm get false positives
too.
So cases 2 and 3 —that correspond to intru-
sions 5 and 21—have a common event to check—
event type 6—and this common event should be
taken into account in the calculation of the penalty,
i.e., if two violations occur—as was described
previously—then the penalty value should be 2,
instead of 1 as was implied by (18).
More testing was done in order to corroborate the
false positives obtained when running the algorithm
with the ﬁtness originally suggested. The algorithm
then fails with the ﬁtness function proposed and the
parameters used (21).
3) A New Fitness Function is Proposed: As
stated before, the term
PNa
i=1 Ii was incorrectly
guiding the ﬁtness function, and the term T 2 was
counting the over estimates in an incorrect way. So
the solution proposed has two parts (22) (20) (19):
1) remove the positive component
PNa
i=1 Ii, and
2) count overestimates in a correct way; this
means, if two intrusions require an excess
number of occurrences of the same event then
count them twice, and so forth.
With this in mind and the experience gained with
testing, the ﬁtness function proposed only has the
penalty function, and as the number of events is Ne,
the new ﬁtness function suggested is
F(I) = Ne − T
0
It must be taken into account that the role of α
corresponds now to Ne and that β is equal to one.
However, the term
PNa
i=1 Ii was removed, as stated
before, in order to avoid false positives.
Another way to justify removing the positive
component is because the term
PNa
i=1 Ii is giving
the number of intrusions hypothesized but those
intrusions have not been evaluated yet. In doing the
evaluations, that may produce an incorrect count of
overestimates.
Now, the hypothesized vector I is really evaluated
in T 0; the better the hypothesized vector, the smaller
T 0 is, and of course, F(I) → Ne, the maximum
in the function proposed. The ﬁtness function is
evaluating only the T 0 term. There is a maximum
when T 0 = 0.
10 run Average %
User False + False - Detected False + False - Detected
2051 7 0 0 3 0 0 100
2051 11 0 0 4 0 0 100
2506 15 0 0 4 0 0 100
Zero Vector 0 0 0 0 0 100
One Intrus. 0 0.1 0.9 0 10 90
Two Intrus. 0 0 2 0 0 100
Three Intrus. 0 0 3 0 0 100
TABLE VIII
RESULTS WITH F(I) = Ne −
PNe
i=1 Ti
It must be stated that this ﬁtness function was
found after much testing and that is not the goal of
this report to show all the steps followed. But, in
order to give some insight into the way this ﬁtness
function came into account, note that a two phase
algorithm was considered: one phase determines
the number of intrusions, and another determines
the intrusions themselves. The corresponding ﬁtness
functions proposed were:
PNa
i=1 Ii − Na/Ne ∗ T for
phase I, and Ne − T for phase II. Problems were
found again with the ﬁtness function
PNa
i=1 Ii −
Na/Ne ∗ T, because of the positive side. Then this
phase was abandoned and phase II was adopted.
Phase II requires the number of intrusions to be
found and, as it is not known, this parameter is
set to the maximum number of intrusion—in this
paper 24. Phase II begins to climb in order to ﬁnd
the Na intrusions and, in doing that, the algorithm
sequesters intrusions until it can not climb more. In
this case, the ones that are sequestered correspond
to local maximums—ﬁtness value of Ne—, i.e.,
individuals with intrusions. So, each time a new
local maximum is found it is compared with the
previous one, intrusion by intrusion; if there is a new
one, then the entire set is tested again in order to
check if there is violation of the constraint; if there
is no violation then this new intrusion is added, and
if there is a violation, the new intrusion is cataloged
as an exclusive intrusion.
The results found with the new ﬁtness function
are shown in Table VIII. As can be seen, with the
new ﬁtness function there are no false positives
and the number of false negatives decreases dra-
matically. This time 70 runs were performed with
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MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory (23)) and only one time
a false negative was present.
4) Improvements to GASSATA: Logs are part of
systems and security logs are necessary in critical
applications, especially those related with secrets of
states, customer databases, and bank transactions, to
list a few. Almost all computer systems have logs;
the problem is the use of the log’s data, because
usually there is no adequate tool to read them;
sometimes the computer administrator has to read
the log as a bunch of text-based information.
In this research a tool is developed to read logs,
with the principal purpose to get intrusions, follow-
ing the guidelines of a genetic algorithm, GASSATA,
suggested by (18), and improves that algorithm in
order to:
• dismiss false positives and false negatives,
• ﬁnd the maximum set of intrusions and disag-
gregate them as mutually exclusive or not,
• record all events not considered in the intrusion
analysis, and
• detect the absence of intrusions.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The need for automated audit trail analysis in
computers, as reported by (24) is still present. The
use of information provided by operating systems
adds capabilities to the security of the information
and data in computers. With IDSs that use logs
containing events, ﬁle access and user activity can
be monitored. Any time a speciﬁc ﬁle is opened or
closed, or a login or log off procedure is executed,
they are logged in the audit trail ﬁle, and the IDS
can monitor this, based on its current thresholds.
Intrusion detection is an integral part of computer
security. Intrusion detection improves the security
of information systems by allowing the review of
patterns of access in order to discover abnormal
activity of users and serving as a deterrent to users’
attempts to bypass system privilege or protection
mechanisms.
Although many approaches have been explored
for doing intrusion detection, most commercial
products conﬁne themselves to traditional meth-
ods like statistical characterization of user activ-
ity and usage patterns (1), as Denning’s seminal
work proposes. Although her model is based on
the assumption of what constitutes “normality,” her
model could be complemented with misuse de-
tection. These two types of intrusion detection—
abnormal and misuse—constitute the two sides of
a coin. With abnormal deviation unknown intru-
sions can be discovered and with misuse detection
known intrusions can be recognized. Moreover, the
possible overload imposed by the use of proﬁles
can be reduced with risk analysis, maintenance, and
distributed of the IDS. With risk analysis high risks
should be evaluated and those could be addressed
with a distributed architecture. Maintenance closes
the cycle of user activity in the system, i.e., people
who should no longer have access to the system
have their privileges removed.
Research, study, and improvements of new in-
trusion techniques is a challenge that is addressed
principally by the university community. This report
presented some of this new research in intrusion
detection, in one case by the use of genetic program-
ming (GP) as proposed by (17). Although their idea
of use of agents is quite good, the consideration of
control should be addressed, as well as the overhead
imposed by the training of the agents and by the
agents on the system. Although the papers reviewed
showed simple rules to get intrusions, more research
should be done with this paradigm. However, a
question that arises is: are there other heuristic
methods that can accomplish this task better than
the GP approach proposed? If we compare with
another heuristic method like a genetic algorithm
(GA)—as a matter of example—we see that GP is
better, in the sense that it was designed to evolve
solutions of different sizes, a matter that differs
somehow from the common use of GAs as ﬁxed
length solutions. GP offers a chance to see intrusion
detection systems with the ability to evolve. Agents
can be retrained in order to get new types of
intrusions. However, the period of retraining is an
open question.
For the case of the GA as an analytical engine
that performs intrusion detection, (18)’s approach
provides a solution to a NP-complete problem that
grows exponentially as the number of intrusions
grows. In this study we considered 24 intrusions,
so the search space was 224, i.e., it was on the
order of sixteen million. If we consider one more
intrusion, the search space is 225, that corresponds to
thirty two million in order of magnitude. This makes
the GA engine an appealing tool in the search for
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function proposed by (18)—with the parameters
used in this paper—gives us high false positive and
false negative rates, besides the trouble of setting
those parameters. We propose a simple and effective
ﬁtness function that overcomes the false positive and
false negative rate problem and that avoids the use
of parameters.
Our question already arises: are there other
heuristic methods that can accomplish this task
better than the GA proposed? The only way to
know it would be to try some and compare—as a
matter of example we tried to use neural networks
(NN) to solve the problem, and when the neural net
converged we ran into the problem of the boundary
that separates intrusions from no intrusions, because
the solution vector converged to real values as is
common in NN.
One ideal topic to consider is the standardiza-
tion of the audit trail ﬁle. Such a standard would
have the principal beneﬁt that it would enable
logs generated by different operating systems to be
reconciled. Organizations have multiple computers
from different branches. This can result in multiple
operating systems and applications. With the audit
trail standardized, the analysis of logs by a central
engine is simpler, because that engine need not to
know the types of operating systems that generated
those logs (25).
The ﬁeld is deep and there are promising new
ways to think about it. There are new paradigms
to explore and we can use computers themselves
as the vehicle, approaches such as immune systems
and neural networks have been developed in order
to improve this mechanism.
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